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Abstract  
Purpose: This study aims to examine the extent to which corporate governance structures and 
ownership types are associated with the level of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures 
(CSRD) in a developing country. 
Design/methodology/approach: Multiple regression techniques are used to estimate the effect of 
corporate governance structures and ownership types on CSRD using a sample of Libyan oil and 
gas companies between 2009 and 2013. 
Findings: First, our results suggest that although the level of CSRD in Libya is low in comparison 
to its western counterparts, ownership factors have a significant positive influence on CSRD. 
Second, we find board meetings to have a positive impact on CSRD. However, we fail to find any 
significant effect of board size and presence of CSR committees on CSRD. Overall, our results 
support prior theoretical evidence that pressures exerted by the government and external 
stakeholders have a considerable influence in promoting firm-level CSRD activities, specifically 
as a legitimising mechanism in fragile states. 
Research limitations/implications: First, our research is based on the annual reports and it did 
not examine any other reports or other mass communication mechanism that companies’ 
management may use to disclose CSR information. Future studies might consider disclosures in 
other channels, if any, such as the internet, CSR reports etc. Additionally, this research adopts the 
neo-institutional theory perspective. Future studies might integrate multi-theoretical lense to offer 
a richer basis for understanding and explaining CSRD determinants. 
Originality/value: Our research contributes to the literature by first providing additional evidence 
for existing studies, which suggest that on average better-governed companies are more liable to 
follow a more socially responsible agenda than poorly governed companies as a legitimising 
mechanism in fragile states. Also, our study overcomes a major weakness in existing Libyan 
studies, which have mainly used descriptive data. 
  
1. Introduction  
The growing importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has propelled business 
organisations to engage in the disclosure of information pertaining to their CSR activities. Our 
review of literature highlights that, although there are existing studies which have examined the 
determinants of CSR Disclosure (CSRD) in several developed countries (e.g., Chan et al., 2014; 
Jizi et al., 2014), those studies examining the same in developing countries is limited (Khan et al., 
2013) with minimal or low levels of CSRD being reported by companies operating in these contexts 
(Nurhayati et al., 2016). This disparity suggests that CSRD is influenced by the motives, choices 
and values of firm-level decision-makers (Khan et al., 2013). Thus a consideration of CSRD 
determinants, particularly that of ownership structure and board composition, within the 
developing country context, is worthy of being examined, given their potential to influence CSRD 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Furthermore, exploring this aspect through the lenses of neo-
institutional theory is further limited (e.g., Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
These extant research gaps necessitate further CSRD studies in developing countries, specifically 
those which have a unique institutional environment, such as that of Libya (Alferjani et al., 2018).   
Several significant institutional and economic attributes make Libya a unique and interesting 
environment for investigating the impact of ownership types and corporate governance in relation 
to CSRD. First, Libya is characterized by limited disclosure and transparency, resulting from 
fragile corporate disclosure regulations (Alferjani et al., 2018). Second, Libya is a country which 
has witnessed changes in its government regime; unlike developed countries, which are 
characterized by relative stability in their systems of governance (Alferjani et al., 2018; Elamer, 
2017; Elamer et al., 2018). Third, the state and its institutional environment in Libya is weak, with 
local and non-state actors driving the political transition, driven by a free media, and an emergent 
civil society (Boduszyński & Pickard, 2013) resulting in a difficult and challenging business 
environment. Thus, there are marked differences between the institutional contexts of Libya as 
compared with other countries, cognisant of a fragile state.   
Further and notwithstanding the lack of evidence relating to the governance-CSRD nexus, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is only one research that has examined whether governance 
structure can affect CSRD. Benomran et al. (2015) examined the effect of corporate governance 
on the CSR and environmental reporting levels in Libyan companies using mixed methods. 
However, the paper is somewhat limited. First, the sample of Benomran et al. (2015) contains 
financial (38%) and non-financial firms, which may mislead the quantitative results due to the 
nature of financial firms. Second, although Benomran et al. (2015) partially examined the oil 
sector, their sample is limited; their sample only contains 12 companies (45% of total 
observations). We have extended the sample to include all oil and gas firms with a total of 112 
observations in a relatively more recent period. We have also included more ownership and 
governance structures within our research (e.g., foreign ownership, board meetings and CSR 
committee). 
Essentially, we expect to make several contributions to the existing literature. First, our 
research findings provide additional evidence to the limited empirical studies of CSRD itself in 
developing countries (e.g., Nurhayati et al., 2016), which suggest that on average the level of 
CSRD is still low in these countries in comparison to Western countries. Second, by examining 
the ‘determinants’ of CSRD in a developing country context, our research offers evidence that 
purports the influence of government ownership, joint venture ownership, foreign ownership, 
frequency of board meetings, and CSR committee existence on CSRD practices. These results 
contribute towards extending extant literature focusing on the implementation perspectives of 
CSRD practices by explaining how specific determinants contribute to or impede their 
development (Khan et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), ultimately suggesting that better 
governed companies are more liable to follow a more socially responsible agenda than poorly 
governed companies. Third, our research adds to the limited empirical studies that uses a neo-
institutional theoretical construct to examine the determinants of CSRD (Amran & Haniffa, 2011; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature and develops our hypotheses. In section three, we discuss our study design before 
presentation and discussion of the empirical findings. The final section presents a conclusion. 
2. Theorisation and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Neo-institutional Theory 
Neo-institutional theory suggests that the institutional environment influences the procedures and 
understandings by which companies function, and emphasises how constitutive societal views 
come to be entrenched in organisations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
It concentrates on the behaviour of companies who are motivated by pressures in broader society 
and focuses on how firms can attain support and gain legitimacy within a specific institutional 
milieu; by accommodating to norms, rules, and routine interests that are highly respected by the 
society. As such, through adopting and maintaining particular organisational structures, practices, 
and policies, firms can display their conformity and compliance to institutional pressures that 
would result in “legitimacy” (Patten & Crampton, 2004).  
We adopt the neo-institutional theory for interpreting CSRD practices, for the following 
reasons. First, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) explain that neo-institutional theory offers a clear 
foundation for examining the impact of “radical changes” in the institutional context upon 
organisational practice adoption, which is currently the case in Libya. Neo-institutional theory 
explains how firms accept and respond to such, altering institutional and social pressures and 
anticipations to sustain legitimacy. Second, neo-institutional theory is a dominant theoretical 
perspective that offers an explanation for how the mechanisms used by firms align perceptions of 
their practice with social and cultural values (Amran & Haniffa, 2011). Consequently adopting 
this theory, which has been suggested as having great potential in explaining CSRD within the 
context of developing countries (Milne & Patten, 2002), may provide evidence for its applicability 
in Libya. In such countries, behaviour of management, including legitimacy, might not be 
controlled by managers themselves, but rather by “institutional pressures” that construct 
tendencies towards isomorphism within the organisational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). We also adopt neo-institutional theory in line with previous studies 
(Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
2.2 Government Ownership 
From a neo-institutional standpoint, the government, as a social institution, has the coercive 
authority of the state through the enforcement of law to control the behaviour of other social actors, 
comprising of those at the organisational level (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). Thus, 
government ownership is expected to create pressures for firms to reveal extra information, since 
the government body is trusted by the public and will need to meet the public’s expectations 
(Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015). However, countries that have a poor governance system (i.e. 
one with high levels of fraud and corruption) might lead to poor CSRD practice. Indeed, Dhouibi 
and Mamoghli (2013) suggest that the Tunisian government ownership negatively influenced the 
extent of CSRD practice. This suggests that the political connections in government owned 
companies denigrates the enforcement actions through corrupt officials and weakens regulation 
from authorities (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
Empirically, Nazli and Ghazali (2007), Amran and Devi (2008), Said et al. (2009), Haji (2013), 
Khan et al. (2013), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), and recently, Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015), 
found that government ownership is statistically significant and positively linked to the extent of 
CSRD practices. Whilst Dam and Scholtens (2012) found that government ownership is negatively 
linked to the extent of CSR practices. In spite of this mixed evidence, and since the majority of 
empirical studies suggest a significant positive relationship; the subsequent first hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:   
H1:  There is a positive and significant relationship between government ownership and the 
extent of CSRD practice.  
2.3 Joint Venture Ownership 
From the neo-institutional theory perspective, companies with a joint venture type ownership 
might be pressured either informally or formally by their home institutional agents to adopt 
specific organisational practices in their host-countries (Amran and Devi, 2008). Empirical 
research which examines the relationship between joint venture ownership and CSRD have 
reported a positive relationship between  joint venture ownership and CSRD (Amran and Devi, 
2008; Amran and Haniffa, 2011). Consequently, the second hypothesis is articulated as follows:  
H2:  There is a positive and significant relationship between a firm that has foreign business 
partners and the extent of CSRD practice.  
2.4 Foreign Ownership 
For foreign owned companies, CSRD might work as a legitimating strategy to achieve continued 
inflows of capital and to attract new potential investors at the host-country level (Amran & Haniffa, 
2011; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Therefore foreign owned companies are more likely to be 
sensitised and aware of the increased pressures for businesses to be socially responsible in the 
wider global community; thus they may be compelled to concede to mimetic pressures through 
CSRD (Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015). Empirically, the literature is in line with the view that 
foreign ownership is associated with a high extent of CSRD practices (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Khan et al., 2013; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015). Therefore, the third hypothesis is formulated 
as follows: 
H3:  There is a positive and significant relationship between foreign ownership and the extent 
of CSRD practice.     
2.5 Board Size 
From an efficiency and legitimacy perspective, corporate boards with a large number of members 
are linked with high managerial monitoring that could develop operations by accommodating to 
the firms’ conferred norms and regulations (Alnabsha et al., 2018; Elamer et al., 2018; Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). Consequently, large boards are expected to be involved more in CSRD 
practices than their smaller counterparts (Elmagrhi et al., 2016, 2018). In contrast, others argue for 
smaller sized boards, stating that boards which are small in size are more valuable in supervising 
actions of management than large boards.  
The majority of prior empirical evidence suggests that board size impacts positively on the 
extent of CSRD (Esa & Nazli, 2012; Said et al., 2009; Suyono & Al Farooque, 2018). However, 
Sufian and Zahan (2013) report no relationship between board size and the extent of CSRD 
practices. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis is articulated as follows: 
H4: There is a positive and significant relationship between board size and the level of CSRD 
practice. 
2.6 Frequency of Board Meetings 
The frequency of board meetings can help to improve effectiveness of a company in terms of 
managerial monitoring and performance. Haji (2013) and Jizi et al. (2014) suggest that the number 
of board meetings is perceived as a sign of an active and dedicated board in managing and 
addressing organisational issues. This implies that active board members should contribute to 
different initiatives including CSRD practices towards intentionally building a better corporate 
image. In this regard, the Libyan Commercial Activity Law No. 23 of 2010 requires that firms 
which are, either fully or partially, owned by the state are to have six mandatory board meetings 
per year. Consequently, the fifth hypothesis to be tested is articulated as follows: 
H5: There is a positive and significant relationship between number of board meetings and the 
extent of CSRD practice. 
2.7 Presence of CSR Committees 
Theoretically, from a neo-institutional theory perspective, the presence of a CSR committee is 
associated with better monitoring and therefore may positively influence CSRD practice (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). The presence of a CSR committee is linked with better governed companies 
who are likely to be involved in disclosure activities, as a technique for signalling their quality of 
corporate governance (Beekes & Brown, 2006). According to Mallin and Michelon (2011), the 
existence of a CSR committee within a firm helps to improve corporate behaviour to meet 
stakeholders’ expectations. Similarly, Petrovic-Lazarevic (2010) advocates that an enhanced 
corporate governance structure, including a CSR committee, helps to ensure that the firms’ social 
values are aligned with those of the community. Hence, it is expected that firms which have a CSR 
committee will disclose more CSR information. Given the positive impact of CSR committees on 
CSRD practices found by prior literature (e.g., Faisal & Achmad, 2014; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013), the sixth hypothesis is articulated as follows: 
H6:  There is a positive and significant relationship between the presence of CSR committee 
and the extent of CSRD practice. 
3. Research Design   
3.1 Sample 
The sample consists of all oil and gas companies operating in the Libyan oil and gas industry for 
the period 2009-2013. As some companies had already left the country due to the on-going conflict 
and lack of security in Libya (Chivvis & Martini, 2014), 28 firms with a total of 112 firm-years 
observations were gathered. The final sample consisted of only 106 firm-years observations, due 
to missing and incomplete information of 6 annual reports. The data was gathered from three main 
sources. We excluded 2011 for three reasons. The Libyan revolution took place in 2011. Second, 
most of the oil and gas companies were not operating in the country during 2011, therefore, the 
data was not available. Finally, the post revolution government has reiterated its willingness to 
comply with certain social and environmental expectations by issuing and providing 
HSE.GDL.001.00 and HSE.PRO.002.00 social responsibility monitoring reporting requirements 
guidelines post-2011. The goal of these requirements is to effectively communicate the present 
social responsibility to generate sustainability in the long term; appreciating the complexity of the 
social, economic and cultural context to meet the national requirements, and ensure adherence to 
internal pressures and obtain internal legitimacy (NOC Department, 2014).  
We used annual reports because various stakeholders use annual reports as the main source of 
assured information which has a higher prospective to have impact because of its wide spread 
delivery (Unerman, 2000). Furthermore, their use in capturing CSRD is generally preferred 
(Amran & Devi, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Nazli & Ghazali, 2007), and longitudinal analysis 
can be feasible, which allows the researchers to trace the development of any CSR changes.  
3.2 Measuring CSRD 
The extent of CSRD by firms was investigated by the use of a weighted content analysis technique 
(Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Previous studies have tended to 
use four main approaches to measure the level of CSRD namely, disclosure index of 0 and 1, 
sentences, pages and words (Gray et al., 1995b). We reject the first as it does not indicate how 
much emphasis is given to a specific subject area and therefore the total number of CSRD might 
be misleading. We also ignored the sentences and pages methods as the analysis of photographs 
and pictures is far more subjective than the interpretation of words. For instance, two sentences 
which are the same, but in dissimilar font sizes might create dissimilar outcomes if the proportion 
of pages is used as measurement units. Thus, consistent with the guidelines provided by several 
prior studies (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2005), the individual words method was used to measure the 
level of CSRD. Although counting words has been critiqued by some (Unerman, 2000), it has been 
utilized in several earlier studies (e.g. Esa & Nazli, 2012; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Using words 
in this research has thus offered us a more limited analysis, being capable of much easier 
categorization, and was considered to be better for articulating the significance placed on a 
disclosure category as well as full robustness against error in computing the amount of disclosure 
(Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). Moreover, counting words is an ideal measure when “it is intended 
to measure the amount of total space devoted to a topic and to ascertain the importance of that 
topic” (Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000, p. 17) as it is a more reliable and accurate approach. 
Additionally, we follow previous studies (Gray et al., 1995b; Mashat, 2005) to examine the content 
of five CSR categories namely environment, human resources, energy, community involvement, 
and product and consumer.  
Reliability and consistency are crucial in the use of content analysis to ensure that the allocated 
unit of analysis is reliable (Jizi et al., 2014). To ensure reliability in the measurement used, 8 firms’ 
annual reports were first autonomously coded by the researchers and a few other colleagues, on a 
sample of text to increase the reliability of the research study. The scores provided by two 
independent coders, along with the score computed by one of the authors, were utilized to assess 
the scoring method reliability.  
3.3 Model Specification 
To test the association between the level and determinants of CSRD, this research follows prior 
studies (Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013), by using a regression model. This regression model is 
set out below:  
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑉𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖CONTROLS𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where, CSRD refers to the corporate social responsibility disclosure score measured by number of 
words. GOVOWN, dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company is fully government owned 
and 0 otherwise. JVOWN, dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company is joint venture 
owned and 0 otherwise. FOROWN, dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company is fully 
foreign owned and 0 otherwise. BSIZE, board size as measured by the number of members on the 
board. FBM, frequency of board meetings measured by the total of board meetings held each year. 
CSRC, corporate social responsibility committee is measured with a dummy variable with the 
value of 1 if the company’ has CSR committee, 0 otherwise. PC, parent company factor is 
measured with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the company’ parent disclose CSR 
information, 0 otherwise. 
CONTROLS refer to the four control variables; namely firm size as measured by number of 
employees, firm age, measured by the number of years from inception, profitability measured by 
net income over total assets and four years of dummies for 2009 to 2013 to reduce the potential of 
omitted variable bias (Elamer & Benyazid, 2018; Haji, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013). 
α refers to Constant term or intercept, it period indicators, and 𝜀 the error term. 
4. Results and Discussion   
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of CSRD  
The overall average of the extent of CSRD for the entire sample totalled a mean score of 227.15 
words. However, the findings in the year 2009 show that the extent of CSRD ranged from 1 to 501 
words, with a mean score of 226.16 words. In contrast, in the year 2010, the extent of CSRD score 
is ranged from 3 to 479 words with a mean score of 200.64 words. In the year 2012 and 2013, the 
extent of CSRD score ranged from 4 to 512 words, with a mean score of 252.46, and from 50 to 
453 words, with a mean score of 229.48, respectively. The findings demonstrate that the extent of 
CSRD scores slightly increased from the year 2009 to 2013 as indicated by the mean scores of 
226.16 and 229.48 words, respectively.    
The simultaneous increase in the overall mean of CSRD practices might be attributed to 
numerous contextual changes; such as the establishment of HSE.GDL.001.00 and 
HSE.PRO.002.00 social responsibility monitoring reporting guidelines, and the opening of a 
Sustainable Development Department within the NOC in Libya. This suggests that firms would 
engage in a higher level of CSRD practices following changes as they would want to respond to 
the state’s initiatives, aspirations and interests in the environmental effects of business activities 
within the social spheres - for legitimacy purposes. However, a failure to respond to such changes 
may result in a break of the social contract, therefore possibly risking the existence of the company 
(Haji, 2013). 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
On an individual category basis, most of the oil and gas firms disclosed information related to 
human resources (mean = 113.00 words). The second most disclosed type of CSR information 
related to environment (mean = 88.52 words). The extent of energy score ranged from 0 to 182 
words with a mean score of 12.99 words. This is followed by the community involvement category 
and the consumer category respectively. Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the 
CSRD on an individual category basis.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Empirically, the findings on the overall level of CSRD is low when compared with Western 
countries, such as US (Jizi et al., 2014), and Australia (Loh et al., 2015). Yet it is equivalent to 
previous Libyan studies (Mashat, 2005). On an individual category basis, these findings are largely 
consistent with the observation that firms that operate in controversial industries usually disclose 
more information on human resources and environment categories. For example, and in line with 
the results of past evidence contextually (Mashat, 2005) and globally ( Gray et al., 1995a), Jizi et 
al. (2014) report that the most disclosed type of CSR information is mainly related to human 
resources. This finding implies that employees are vital assets to companies and therefore, by 
disclosing more information on this category, it may have an important influence on current and 
future investors’ assessment of companies. As such, oil and gas firms seem to pay a great deal of 
attention to legitimation strategies related to human resources and environment categories when 
preparing their annual reports due to the sensitivity of the industry where such companies work. 
The descriptive statistics for all independent variables used in this research are provided in 
Table 3. The average government ownership (GOVOWN) of the research sample is 31%, while 
the average of joint venture ownership (JVOWN) is 27%, and the average foreign ownership 
(FOROWN) is 42%. The average frequency of board meetings (FBM) of the sample is 7.88%, 
whilst the average of the board size (BSIZE) is 5.05%, and the average presence of a CSR 
committee (CSRC) is 15% and 38% for the parent company factor (PACOM).  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 provides the correlation matrix amongst the variables used. We use a Spearman 
correlation matrix in order order to test the direction and degree of a linear relationship between 
the variables as it aids in identifying the potential existence of multicollinearity amongst the 
variables. To check the problem of multicollinearity, the rule of thumb is when the correlation is 
> 0.800 (Gujarati, 2003), it indicates that the multicollinearity problem does exist. In table 4, the 
correlation matrix for the dependent, explanatory and control variables utilized for the CSRD 
model are shown. The directions of Person correlation coefficients are relatively low, indicating 
strong justifications that the multicollinearity problem amongst the variables in the model does not 
exist. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
We further conducted two tests namely Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance to detect 
whether the multicollinearity problem among the variables does exist. It is suggested that there 
could be a multicollinearity problem when values of VIF are greater than 10 (Gujarati, 2003) and 
tolerance level values <0.1. The values of VIF and the tolerance statistic test for all variables used 
in this model fall between a minimum of 1.50 and a maximum of 8.62 for VIF and between 0.116 
and 0.665 for the tolerance respectively. The values of both the VIF and the tolerance statistic do 
not indicate any serious collinearity in the model. We also examined the homoscedasticity by 
placing the “standardized residuals” against the “standardized predicted” on a graph. The results 
indicate that the points are randomly and evenly dispersed and scattered around the horizontal line, 
therefore the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met and satisfied.  
We ran two additional tests: one related to the presence of autocorrelation by using Durbin-
Watson test value and the other one related to the exploring the linearity by using Cook’s distance 
values. According to Gujarati (2003), the rule thumb of checking autocorrelation is a value close 
to 2 shows non-autocorrelation whereas a value near to 0 shows positive autocorrelation and a 
value nearby 4 indicates negative autocorrelation. The results of the Durbin-Watson value in this 
research is 2.31 among the model used.  The values of Cook’s distance for the model ranged 
between the minimum value of 0.000 and the maximum value of 0.087. Therefore the findings of 
both tests indicate non-autocorrelation and no linear relationship among the variables utilized in 
this model. 
The analysis of the influence of determinants of CSRD on oil and gas companies’ CSRD for 
the four-year period was undertaken using two models; one including company characteristics and 
the other one without company characteristics variables. This was done to isolate any potential 
effects of firm company characteristics on CSRD. The findings are reported below in Table 5.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
Our results support hypothesis one, which predicted that there is a statistically significant and 
positive relationship between government ownership and the extent of CSRD practices. This 
finding contradicts the evidence of negative influence by Dam and Scholtens (2012), however it 
offers support for similar results of existing empirical studies in the literature (e.g. Amran & Devi, 
2008; Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Haji, 2013; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015; Nazli & Ghazali, 
2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Said et al., 2009).  Furthermore, it is also supported by the neo-
institutional theory assumption that companies that are owned by the government can be 
institutionalized by the government’s objectives, beliefs and initiatives concerning CSRD 
practices. Theoretically such a finding implies that the government can be considered as exerting 
coercive pressure on government-owned firms to disclose their CSR information. This suggests 
that such firms tend to be more politically sensitive as their activities are more in the eyes of the 
public, and thus, there is a strong expectation for such companies to be aware of their public 
responsibility. Thus they are more involved in socially responsible actions to legitimize their 
presence (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Nazli & Ghazali, 2007). Consequently, the implication 
of this finding suggests that the government can enact regulations through the coercive power of 
the state to regulate the behaviour of lower members of society. 
Hypothesis two, which predicted a statistically significant and positive relationship between a 
firm that has a foreign business partner and the extent of CSRD practices, is empirically supported 
by our data. This implies that companies that have foreign partners, such as Mellita Oil and Gas 
company and Zueitina Oil company from the US and Germany, are influenced by the culture of 
their overseas partners who have a high awareness of CSRD practice. Theoretically this finding 
suggests that the level of coercive isomorphism pressure, if not mimetic, on the local partner to 
adopt CSRD may be compelling enough to encourage firms to disclose significantly. 
Consequently, the implication of this finding is that local companies are likely to meet the 
expectations of foreign investors on CSRD. Therefore, a mutual understanding in all features of 
business operations, including CSRD with foreign partners, seems to be a wise strategy. 
Empirically our finding does not lend support to the findings of previous studies that suggest 
foreign partners have an insignificant influence on the extent of CSRD practices (Amran & Devi, 
2008; Amran & Haniffa, 2011).  
Hypothesis three, which predicted that foreign ownership positively influences the extent of 
CSRD practice, is also empirically supported. Theoretically this finding suggests that the need for 
legitimacy and public accountability is more of an issue in companies with foreign ownership 
because of powerful outsider interest.  This is reinforced by increased noticeability to stakeholders 
at the host-country level and leads to heightened expectations and monitoring of their CSRD 
practice. Therefore, foreign owned companies might be sensitised and aware of the increased 
pressures for businesses to be socially responsible in the wider global community, and may also 
be compelled to concede to mimetic pressures through CSRD. Thus, CSRD is being used as, 
perhaps, a practical legitimising strategy to achieve continued inflows of capital and to attract new 
potential investors at the host-country level. The implication of this finding therefore suggests that 
foreign companies have better financial knowledge and information advantages linked to 
contextual matters over local companies, therefore managers of foreign firms tend to invest more 
in CSRD practices in line with the expectations of their shareholders. This is perhaps done to re-
establish or strengthen their competitiveness and make themselves stand out in the expectation that 
this may give them the priority in the future of securing new contracts for oil and gas exploration. 
Empirically, this finding contradicts the results of prior studies in the context of developing 
countries (Amran & Haniffa, 2011; Said et al., 2009), however provides support for similar 
findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Khan et al. (2013), and Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015).  
Hypothesis four, which predicted that there is a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board size and the extent of CSRD practice, is empirically rejected. The 
insignificant influence of board size on the extent of CSRD practice provides support for similar 
results by Sufian and Zahan (2013) and Haji (2013), however it contradicts the findings of Said et 
al. (2009), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), and Jizi et al. (2014). The current evidence is not 
consistent with the predictions of neo-institutional theory.  However, from a legitimisation view, 
it implies that larger boards are linked to fewer CSRD practices. In other words, the presence of 
different stakeholders on larger boards is associated with less managerial monitoring, therefore 
leading to less demand of CSRD practices.  The implication of this finding suggests that as a 
board’s size increases, there is a greater possibility that managers’ monitoring will decrease.  In 
other words, the larger boards are associated with more communication and a coordination 
problem, which can impact negatively on the role of a board monitoring CSRD. The other 
implication of this finding is that appointments of a larger board may be made to meet affirmative 
action provisions, such as concentrating on providing direction for the company on other targets, 
rather than their contributions to board decisions on issues of environmental and social information 
disclosure.  
Hypothesis five, which predicted a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
the frequency of board meeting and the extent of CSRD practice, is empirically accepted. 
Theoretically the frequency of board meetings helps companies to improve managerial monitoring 
and performance.  It constitutes a way of enhancing legitimacy by serving as sign of an active and 
dedicated board in managing and addressing organisational social issues. Consequently, more 
meetings may put more pressure on managers to engage in CSRD practices. The implication of 
this finding supports the idea that the frequency of board meetings is necessarily beneficial and is 
a sign of an active and dedicated board in managing and addressing organisational, social and 
environmental disclosure. Empirically, this finding contradicts the insignificant influence of board 
meetings on the extent of CSRD practices by Haji (2013), however it provides support for the 
findings of Jizi et al. (2014).  
The findings on the CSR committee suggest that companies with CSR committees have 
statistically no influence on the extent of CSRD. This fails to support hypothesis six. This is less 
surprising (empirically) given the small number of CSR committees within corporate boards 
sampled that are currently operating within the oil and gas industry. Theoretically, although 
complying with good corporate governance rules in the form of coercive pressures to increase 
CSRD or increase loyalty to duplicate (mimetic/normative pressures) or implement good CSRD 
practice could improve firms’ effectiveness, the study finding implies that the presence of a CSR 
committee may not be an effective monitoring device for improving CSRD in Libya. The 
implication of this finding suggests that the presence of a CSR committee may not be associated 
with the decision to disclose CSR information within the Libyan institutional environment. 
Consequently, the theoretical recommendation that firms should have a CSR committee to disclose 
more CSR information may not necessarily be applicable to companies functioning in the Libyan 
oil and gas sector. Empirically, our finding is consistent with that of Rankin et al. (2011), however 
it contradicts the evidence of positive influence by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), and Faisal and 
Achmad (2014). 
4.2 Robustness analyses  
To check the robustness or sensitivity of the relationship between CSRD determinants and extent 
of CSRD, another regression test was conducted using the lagged effect model. The main model 
of CSRD is re-estimated with a one-year lag between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
independent variables (Ntim et al., 2012). This is because the dependent variable might be 
impacted by the prior years’ corporate attributes (the explanatory variables). For example, 
establishing a CSR committee within a firm may not influence the CSRD practice in the same 
year, rather, the following year. Consequently, this sample excluded 2010 as the first year, thereby 
reducing the total company-year observations from 106 to 78.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
In line with earlier results, government ownership, foreign ownership, parent company are all 
statistically and positively related to CSRD, while the presence of CSR committee is positively 
but still statistically insignificant. However, the coefficients on joint venture ownership and board 
meeting which were statistically significant are no longer statistically significant. In contrast, the 
coefficient on board size which was negative and statistically insignificant in the main model is 
now statistically significant to a lagged structure. With reference to these perceived sensitivities in 
few of the determinants of CSRD, it might be because of “misspecifications” within the operational 
equation, such as possible omitted variables bias, or it might be elucidated by the variances in the 
number of company-year observations.  Generally, and on a comparative basis, it provides extra 
support empirically to the earlier conclusion in the main model that there is either a statistically 
strong or insignificant association between most of the seven individual CSRD determinants and 
the extent of CSRD practices.  
Furthermore, we repeated the analyses in Tables 5 using a Tobit model to account for its 
censored nature. The findings, which are reported in Table 6, are very similar to those reported 
above. 
5. Conclusion 
This study examined the extent to which corporate governance structures and ownership types 
were associated with the level of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures (CSRD) in a 
developing country. Using a large sample from Libyan oil and gas companies from 2009 to 2013, 
our results are three-fold. First, our results suggest that although the level of CSRD in Libya is low 
in comparison to its western counterparts, ownership factors have a significant positive influence 
on CSRD. Second, we find board meetings to have a positive impact on CSRD. However, we 
failed to find any significant effect of board size and presence of CSR committees on CSRD. 
Overall, our results support prior theoretical evidence that pressures exerted by the government 
and external stakeholders have a considerable influence in promoting firm-level CSRD activities, 
specifically as a legitimising mechanism in fragile states. 
Contrary to expectations, we find that determinants of CSRD such as government ownership, 
joint venture ownership, and foreign ownership to have a positive influence on the extent of CSRD. 
This means that, notwithstanding the absence of legal requirements regarding CSRD in Libya, 
government owned companies in Libya still provide CSR information in their reports. Also, a 
major theoretical implication of the statistically significant and positive relationship between joint 
venture ownership and CSRD is that such firms are institutionalized by the reporting culture of 
their foreign associates. This implies that there is some kind of coercive and/or mimetic pressure 
for domestic companies to adopt CSRD from their business partners (Amran & Haniffa, 2011). 
Likewise, the lack of influence of a CSR committee perhaps implies that the theoretical 
recommendations of firms, that they should have a CSR committee to increase their social and 
environmental disclosure, may not necessarily be applicable to firms operating in the Libyan oil 
and gas industry. As such, the results might have important implications in the present situation of 
Libya, as regulators are trying to undertake additional reforms in corporate governance; especially 
in the light of the country political and institutional changes. This further suggests that Libyan 
legislators may need to exert more pressures on Libyan firms to disclose CSR practises. Hence our 
results shed new insights on the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in improving 
disclosure and accountability. 
Our research contributes to the literature by providing additional evidence for existing studies 
(Jizi et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) which suggest that on average 
better governed companies are more liable to follow a more socially responsible agenda than 
poorly governed companies. By examining the determinants of CSRD in a developing country 
context, our research offers evidence that government ownership, joint venture ownership, foreign 
ownership, frequency of board meeting, and parent company factor have a positive influence on 
CSRD practices, however the presence of a CSR committee and board size show a positive but 
statistically insignificant influence on CSRD. These results contribute towards the literature 
expanding our knowledge of CSRD practices’ implementation by empirically explaining how 
specific determinants contribute to or impede the development of CSRD practices. Meanwhile our 
study also overcomes a major weakness in existing Libyan studies, which have mainly used 
descriptive data. Consequently, this study extends empirical data (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Khan 
et al., 2013; Nazli & Ghazali, 2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) regarding CSRD practices in a 
developing country context.  
Although the research concentrates on Libya, its findings have implications for other Arab 
countries facing similar challenges in implementing CSRD, since they have similarity in their 
socio-cultural environment and share an identical language, culture, religion, and economic 
system. Finally, our results should be of interest to regulators, policy makers, practitioners, and 
companies in developing a more focussed agenda of CSRD activity when considering regulations 
for disclosure. The findings of our study, nevertheless, have several limitations. First, our research 
is based on annual report and it did not examine any other reports or other mass communication 
mechanisms that companies’ management may use to disclose CSR information. However the 
decision to disregard any other type of reports was made based on evidence from prior published 
studies (Mashat, 2005) within developing countries, which implies the annual reports as being the 
key and fundamental channel (or mechanism) for the dissemination of information by companies 
for both non-financial and financial data to a wider group of users (Jizi et al., 2014; Unerman, 
2000). Thus, future studies might consider disclosures in other channels, if any, such as internet, 
CSR reports etc. Additionally, this research adopts the neo-institutional theory perspective, in 
contrast to the body of literature on CSRD determinants and CSRD practices, which prefers agency 
and legitimacy theories. Future studies might integrate these three theories to offer a richer basis 
for understanding and explaining CSRD determinants that influence CSRD practice than would 
be gathered from consideration under one theoretical lens.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the Dependent Variables of CSRD 
Extent of CSRD Pre-revolution Post-revolution  
Years 2009 2010 2012 2013 Total 
Minimum 1 3  4  50  1 
Maximum 501 479  512  453  512 
Mean 226.16 200.64  252.46  229.48  227.15 
Std. Deviation 118.37 116.86  131.10  119.34  121.44 
Skewness 0.682 0. 577  0.253  0.388  0.456 
Kurtosis 0.696 0.611 -0.682 -0.841 -0.288 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of CSRD on an individual category basis 
Description  CSRD Human resources Environment Energy Community 
involvement 
Consumer 
services 
Maximum 512 322 301 182 67 4 
Minimum  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 227.15 113.78 88.52 12.99 11.89 0.06 
Median 210.50 113.00 77.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 
Std. Deviation 121.44 65.878 67.63 29.86 11.78 0.41 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  
GOVOWN 0.31 0.00 0.465 
JVOWN 0.27 0.00 0.420 
FOROWN 0.42 0.00 0.497 
FBM 7.88 7.00 1.829 
BSIZE 5.05 5.00 1.305 
CSRC 0.15 0.00 0.360 
PARCOM 0.38 0.00 0.487 
FSIZE  1612.52 459 1980.77 
FAGE  25.74 26.50 18.45 
ROA -1.38 -1.36 0.473 
Variables are defined as follows: Government ownership (GOVOWN), Foreign ownership 
(FOROWN), Joint venture ownership (JVOWN), Frequency of board meetings (FBM), Board 
size (BSIZE), CSR committee (CSRC), Parent company (PACOM), Firm size (FSIZE), Firm 
age (FAGE), Return on assets (ROA). 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Variables  SIZE AGE GOWN JVOWN FOWN FBM BSIZE  CSRC PCOM CSRD ROA  
SIZE   1           
AGE  0.255**  1          
GOVOWN  0.534**  0.016  1         
JVOWN  0.186  0.018 -0.364**  1        
FOROWN -0.664** -0.117 -0.577** -0.465**  1       
FBM  0.040  0.112  0.180 -0.100 -0.215*  1      
BSIZE  0.001 -0.062  0.195* -0.228*  0.013  0.122  1     
CSRC -0.306**  0.368** -0.283** -0.228*  0.331**  0.390** -0.137  1    
PARCOM -0.327** -0.023 -0.523**  0.137  0.316**  0.127 -0.253*  0.542** 1   
CSRD  0.251**  0.119  0.111 -0.104  0.005  0.319**  0.096***  0.243* 0.172  1  
ROA  -0.123 -0.148  0.173  0.065 -0.208* -0.039 -0.335** -0.018 0.056 -0.416** 1 
Notes: **, * and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure (CSRD), Government ownership (GOWN), Foreign ownership (FOWN), Joint venture ownership (JVOWN), Frequency of board meetings 
(FBM), Board size (BSIZE), CSR committee (CSRC), Parent company (PCOM), Firm size (SIZE), Firm age (AGE), Return on assets (ROA). 
Table 5:  Multiple Regression Results using CSRD as the Dependent Variable 
Model Expected sign  (1) (2) Hypothesis status 
Constant  .239 .005***  
R square  .194 .499  
Adjusted R2  .137 .421  
Durbin-Watson  2.285 2.313  
F- value  3.379 (.003) *** 6.424(.000) ***  
No. of observations  106 106  
Explanatory variables     
Government ownership + .658 (.011) ** .684 (.002) *** Accepted 
Joint venture ownership +    .440 (.066) *   .476 (.020) ** Accepted 
Foreign ownership + .528 (.046) **  .647 (.006) *** Accepted 
Board size +    .101 (.307)  -.052 (.582) Rejected 
Frequency of board meeting + .257 (.025) **   .284 (.007) *** Accepted 
CSR committee +    .163 (.220)    .219 (.104) Rejected 
Parent company +    .194 (.121)  .264 (.024) ** Accepted 
Control variables     
Firm size +    Excluded    .350 (.008) *** Accepted 
Firm age +    Excluded   -.086 (.383) Rejected 
Firm profitability +/-    Excluded   -.416 (.000) *** Accepted 
Year 2009     Excluded     .022 (.814)  
Year 2012     Excluded     .097(.323)  
Year 2013     Excluded     .005(.958)  
Notes: Coefficients are placed before parentheses. ***, ** and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. To avoid the dummy variable trap, 2010 is excluded from regression analysis, while 2009, 
2012, and 2013 are included.
Table 6: Results of Sensitivity Testing on CSRD Model Based on a Lagged CSRD  
 Expected 
sign 
(1) Lagged (2) Tobit  
Constant  .876 .115 -105.930 -273.727 
R square   .188 .526    0.017    0.053 
Adjusted R2  .106 .430   -   - 
Durbin-Watson  2.381 2.342   -   - 
F-value  2.309 (.035) ** 5.466(.000) *** 22.36 (.002) ***    64.21 (.000) *** 
No. of  Observations   78 78 106    106 
Explanatory variables      
Government ownership + .858 (.010) ** .801(.010) ** 149.826(.024) ** 164.392(.004) *** 
Joint venture ownership + .466(.128) .430(.111) 92.298(.176) 103.678(.064) * 
Foreign ownership + .589(.080) * .637(.028) ** 117.474(.065) * 156.764(.004) *** 
Board size + .040(.729) -.213(.051) * 6.126(.501) -9.423(.277) 
Frequency of board meeting + -.020(.891) .198(.161) 20.330(.009) *** 25.030(.000) *** 
CSR committee +        .358(.034) ** .223(.196) 12.344(.803) 13.253(.752) 
Parent company +        .191(.196) .277(.043) ** 73.246(.014) ** 90.154(.000) *** 
Control variables      
Firm size +        Excluded .141(.368) Excluded  0.019(.009) *** 
Firm age +        Excluded -.001(.996) Excluded -0.174(.747) 
Firm profitability +/-        Excluded -.544(.000) *** Excluded -107.776(.000) *** 
Year 2009         Excluded .151(.162) Excluded   5.151(.162) 
Year 2012         Excluded .190(.092) * Excluded   11.190(.042) ** 
Year 2013         Excluded - Excluded    - 
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Appendix  
CSRD Categories  
I Environment  
1 Environmental policy 
2 Environmental audit 
3 Environmental – product and process-related 
4 Environmental financially-related data 
5 Sustainability 
6 Environmental other 
II      Energy  
7 Energy saving and conservation 
8 Use/development/exploration of new sources 
9 Other energy related disclosure 
III   Consumer & product 
10 Product and customer safety 
11 Consumer complaints 
12 Specific consumer relations 
13 Provision for disabled, aged, etc. customers 
14 Provision for difficult-to-reach customers 
IV   Community involvement 
15 Any reference to community and/or social involvement 
16 Employee involvement with above if company support is 
apparent 
17 Donations 
18 Schools, arts, sport, sponsorship 
19 YTS (or equivalent), business-in-the-community, secondment 
of staff 
V     Human resources 
20 Employee data 
21 Pension data 
22 Consultation with employees 
23 Employment of disabled 
24 Value added statement 
25 Health and safety 
26 Share ownership 
27 Employee training 
28 Employee other 
29 General other 
 
